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1 Introduction  
So, who is going to make the first move? If it is a question of perception then the perception 
is in the whole circle. We think we are being measured on a short-term basis and board 
directors think that is what investors want of them so in fact their remuneration 
arrangements are getting shorter and shorter term, with all their LTIPs [long term incentive 
plan] running off annual bonuses, because that is what they think shareholders want, so they 
operate on that basis. Who is going to break that chain? (Skipper, 2006 cited in [1] page 49) 
This is the second of two discussion papers prepared by the Institute for Sustainable Futures 
(ISF) for the Total Environment Centre’s Green Capital program. Green Capital has 
commissioned ISF to undertake research into the causes of, and solutions to, short-termism 
in the finance sector. This paper discusses solutions and should be read in conjunction with 
the first discussion paper Causes of Short-Termism in the Finance Sector and the Action Plan 
Paradigm Shift to Long-termism. Comments from the project focus groups are incorporated in 
this paper. The focus groups are referred to hereafter in this paper as “the first/second 
project focus group”. 
Our analysis of the causes of short-termism shows that they are multi-faceted, complex and 
spread across the investment chain. They are also, in many respects, interdependent. A 
difficulty in addressing short-termism is in identifying where and how to intervene in the 
system for greatest impact.  
Views expressed in recent reports, surveys and consultation exercises suggest that system-
wide change is needed and all parties in the investment chain need to be involved in change. 
In July 2005, The Conference Board Global Corporate Governance Research Center held a 
Corporate/Investor Summit in London that convened some of the most distinguished 
representatives from the corporate and investment worlds, to explore the debate on market 
short-termism. The report from the Summit concluded that: 
…short-termism is so embedded in the way the stock market functions that any attempt to 
tackle it piecemeal will fail…aspects of the entire system must be adjusted all at the same 
time for there to be change [2].  
What is needed, therefore, is a concerted effort by all market participants to adjust the 
system as a whole. 
There appears to be growing and widespread consensus on the need for change. Numerous 
analyses argue that short-termism is not in the best interests of the majority. A small number 
of investors may benefit through vehicles such as hedge funds, but the market and economy 
as a whole lose out when myopia leads to allocative inefficiency. 
The kind of change that is necessary is not likely to be easily achieved. A recent report by the 
Trades Union Congress (TUC) in the UK states that what is needed is “a significant cultural 
change in attitudes to performance”[1], in which fund managers and analysts take account 
of long-term economic, environmental and social challenges. As the TUC report notes: “Such 
fundamental change, in structures or values, may be difficult, if not impossible, to achieve.” 
[1]. In a 1996 UK House of Lords debate on wealth creation and social cohesion, one speaker 
said, “I do not believe there is one single cause or a simple solution to short-
termism…Above all, attitudes will have to change, and few things are more difficult [3]. 
Despite the recognition that change may be difficult, there are serious attempts from within 
the industry to address the issue of short-termism. Recent conferences, studies and reports 
have yielded valuable information and suggestions as to how reform might be achieved. The 
remainder of this paper summarises the ideas that have been put forward to date. 
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2 Systemic solutions to short-termism 
2.1 Reporting and communications 
As identified in the discussion paper on causes of short-termism, reporting and disclosure 
requirements and practices are key factors driving a short-term focus. Correspondingly, 
there are calls for changes in reporting and disclosure. A 2006 report, by the CFA Institute, 
Centre for Financial Market Integrity (CFA Institute), recommends that company reporting 
such as annual reports, should provide more meaningful information about strategy and 
long-term vision. The study suggests that: 
…one of the most important responsibilities of company executives is to communicate and 
act on their corporations’ values and to embed those values in the long-term strategy and 
“value proposition” of the company [4]. 
 In Australia, the Group of 100 (G100) believes that companies should provide shareholders 
with regular communication that focuses on long-term shareholder value creation and how 
current performance reflects progress towards long-term objectives. The G100 also considers 
that Australian companies should not move to reporting more frequently than allowed for 
by the current reporting regime [5]. 
2.1.1 Annual reports 
Annual reports tend to have a narrow financial focus and include mainly backward-looking 
outcome data (lag indicators), rather than information about the activities that drive 
performance (lead indicators) and future prospects. The Conference Board delegates 
discussed the need for improved quality of information flow on corporate assets to enable 
projection of strategic and investment decisions on a longer timeline. Reporting should focus 
on communicating the fundamental business drivers underlying long-term performance – 
these can include intangible factors such as human resources management, governance 
arrangements, risk management, branding, corporate ethics and stakeholder relations. Many 
companies are already attempting to report on intangibles. For example, 52% of the Global 
Fortune Top 250 companies now report on sustainability factors [6].  
The Conference Board cites its own research into long-termism as demonstrating the 
importance of companies having an organisation-wide process for selecting appropriate 
financial and extra-financial measures of business performance [2]. Warren Buffet, the 
former CEO of Berkshire Hathaway, successfully provided insight into the state of his 
company and its long-term outlook in annual reports [4]. 
There are examples of recent regulation designed to improve annual reporting both in 
Australia and overseas. As reported in the Corporations and Markets Advisory Committee’s 
(CAMAC) December 2006 report on corporate social responsibility (CSR) in Australia, the 
UK’s recently enacted Companies Act 2006 includes the requirement for all companies, other 
than small companies, to include in their directors’ report a business review. This review, 
(similar to an operating and financial review) should cover the company’s principal risks 
and uncertainties, including (for listed companies) environmental, employee, social and 
community issues [7]. The UK Department of Trade and Industry sees the Act as promoting 
“forward looking narrative reporting by companies” (Source: Press Release, 8 November 
2006, cited in [7]). Several other recent initiatives aim to improve reporting, such as the 
Enhanced Business Reporting Initiative in the US and the European Union’s Accounts 
Modernisation Directive [2]. 
CAMAC reports on a recent amendment to the Australian Corporations Act (s299A) that 
they believe, “provides a general framework for the disclosure of relevant non-financial 
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information” and “an appropriate basis for reporting about environmental and social issues 
relevant to a company’s business” [7]. The new provision is applicable to annual reports of 
listed companies since 2005 and the CAMAC report recommends extending the reporting 
obligations to all listed entities, not just listed public companies. The CAMAC report lists the 
requirements of s299A as follows: “Listed companies must include in the directors’ report 
any information that shareholders would reasonably require to make an informed 
assessment of: 
 the operations of the company 
 its financial position, and 
 the company’s business strategies and prospects for future years” [7] 
In the CAMAC Committee’s view, the requirements of s299A rest on “an investor protection 
rationale” [7]. 
Section 299A appears to be a positive step towards encouraging disclosure of longer-term 
value drivers, including extra-financial information. It may be expected, for example, that a 
company reporting on operations and prospects for future years would discuss the 
company’s exposure to risk associated with the introduction of a price on carbon. Work to 
calculate and disclose carbon risk is already underway through the Carbon Disclosure 
Project, although this is a voluntary initiative. It is hoped such disclosure will enable 
investors and analysts to better assess the company’s long-term value-creation and risk-
management strategies.  
The s299A requirement to cover prospects for future years should facilitate a shift from a 
short-term performance focus. It remains to be seen, however, how s299A will be 
interpreted and applied. There are already worrying indications that the interpretation may 
be narrow. A group of influential Australian business leaders has recently rejected a 
proposal by the ASX Corporate Governance Council that companies report to shareholders 
about all the risks, including extra-financial risks, which they are facing. They have also 
rejected moves to make it compulsory for listed companies to report on corporate social 
responsibility or sustainability measures [8].  
2.1.2 Alternatives to earnings 
The current obsession with short-term performance measures, primarily earnings, has been 
identified as contributing to myopic behaviour.  Reports such as the CFA Institute report are 
calling for a phasing out of the practice of earnings guidance, which is provided quarterly in 
the US and UK, and every 6 months in Australia. A survey by the CFA Institute found 
strong support among its members for changes to earnings guidance and some companies 
in the US, such as Intel, McDonalds, Motorola and Pfizer are signaling plans to scale back 
focused earnings guidance. 
Much has been written about the effects of quarterly reporting on behaviour in investors, 
fund managers, analysts and corporations. To address this, the CFA Institute promotes a 
shift to provision of “supplemental shareholder value information for investors”. The report 
discusses alternative performance metrics such as discounted cash flow (DCF), condensed 
balanced sheets and more frequent and higher quality operating data, such as monthly data 
provided via company websites – in other words, a move towards publication of high 
quality data that is already used for internal monitoring and decision-making. This, the 
report argues, would enable company executives to educate analysts on the company’s true 
business drivers [4]. 
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Alfred Rappaport, of Northwestern University Kellogg Graduate School of Management, 
has developed an alternative reporting tool, the “Corporate Performance Statement”. A 
Corporate Performance Statement would: 
• “Separate cash flows and accruals 
• Classify accruals by levels of uncertainty 
• Provide a range as well as the most likely estimate for each accrual 
• Exclude arbitrary, value-irrelevant accruals 
• Detail assumptions and risks for each line item” [9] 
The statement would be accompanied by a ‘management discussion and analysis’ section in 
which management presents “the critical assumptions supporting each accrual estimate and 
its business model along with performance indicators, such as customer-retention rates, time 
to market for new products and quality improvements that drive value.” [9] Rappaport 
claims that the Corporate Performance Statement deals directly with the uncertainty 
inherent to current reporting by separating real cash flows from subjective assumptions 
about the future (accruals). By contrast, the Statement provides “a more straightforward 
picture of a company's results” [9]. Rappaport argues that no single-period performance 
measure can substitute for detailed analysis of the industry and company strategies. The 
Corporate Performance Statement does not present a bottom line because “no single number 
can reasonably encapsulate a company's performance.” [9].  
A further beneficial effect of the Corporate Performance Statement could be that it would 
make it easier to base executive remuneration on long-term value rather than short-term 
earnings. Rappaport believes that the information necessary for the Corporate Performance 
Statement should already be available for internal purposes and therefore the learning curve 
for implementing this approach should not be steep. However, “The forgetting curve, the 
time it takes to shed old habits and ways of thinking, will be more challenging.” [9] 
Leading executives are already beginning to adopt alternative conceptual frameworks such 
as Economic Value Added, Cash Flow Return on Investment, Triple Bottom Line (TBL) and 
the Balanced Scorecard. Conceptual frameworks underlie decision-making. For the most 
part, they are so deeply ingrained that they operate at the sub-conscious level and are 
assumed to be truths or reality or ‘worldviews’. The importance of TBL and Balanced 
Scorecard is that they attempt to challenge conventional worldviews by introducing 
additional qualitative elements into decision making; qualitative elements that are foreign to 
existing measurement systems. Given that TBL and Balanced Scorecard are now accepted 
systems, they can be adapted to include measurements that are long-term and not short 
term. Greater use of tools such as these would encourage a move away from over-reliance 
on earnings-based measures and would provide investors with more meaningful 
information on which to base investment decisions.  
Existing metrics of performance were created in an earlier industrial age that focussed on 
the tangible value of capital. Wealth creation is now driven by “thinking-intensive talent” 
rather than capital. In the knowledge-intensive digital age, new performance metrics need to 
be developed which take into account intangibles such as the returns on the talents of people 
within companies. One such metric is performance per employee, which can act as a good 
proxy for earnings on intangibles. It can provide an effective insight into the return on talent 
and “requires no adjustment from accounting conventions” [10]. Researchers are also 
investigating measurement of employee commitment, reputation, attraction and retention 
rates. In Australia, the Society of Knowledge Economics is working on the measurement of 
knowledge capital. Further research is needed both on extra-financial performance metrics 
and on their market appreciation and use [2]. 
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The CFA Institute report recommends use of plain language in disclosures rather than legal 
language and “boilerplate” (standardised) analysis. The report suggests that integration of 
Investor Relations (IR) and legal departments within firms would help to avoid the 
disconnect between information emanating from different departments, which can be 
confusing for investors and analysts. 
The first project focus group discussed the need for better information to underpin decision-
making, whether those decisions are about short or long-term investments. It was also 
suggested that while different information and analysis is needed in the market, it would 
not necessarily be wise to eliminate current sources of information, such as earnings 
guidance, which do perform a useful function for some sectors of the investment 
community. One participant proposed that companies provide a reasonable earnings 
guidance range, as an improvement on current guidance practices. Another participant 
commented that overall, solutions on disclosure should be “more about encouraging longer-
term investment rather than …cutting off information to short-term investors”. Companies 
need to talk to markets about both short-term issues and longer-term issues to cater for 
everyone. Therefore, an information flow specifically tailored to one investor type may not 
be appropriate. 
2.1.3 Additional disclosure 
There is a need for greater disclosure of incentive and performance metrics of both fund 
managers and corporate executives [4]. Such disclosure would enable all parties to make 
more informed assessments of whether the appropriate mechanisms are in place to promote 
a long-term outlook and to encourage change where necessary. In the US, regulation is 
moving in the direction of increased mandatory disclosure. For example, in 2006, the 
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) proposed executive compensation disclosure 
reform that would include, among other requirements, that public companies include in 
their annual reports a comprehensive “executive compensation plan” [2]. As noted above, 
more sophisticated measures of productivity and commitment are being developed. 
In summary, what is needed is more dialogue and improved communications between the 
investor community and the companies in which they invest, with a focus on the true long-
term business drivers of investee companies. Companies need to clarify for investors their 
long-term value proposition. However, the communication of longer-term and extra-
financial factors alone is unlikely to be sufficient to cause the market to take a longer-term 
perspective. Indeed, in the worst-case scenario, in the absence of regulated standards, 
reporting of ‘soft’ information may simply create opportunities for further market 
distortions. 
2.2 Regulation 
There may well be a role for new or different regulation to encourage a more long-term 
approach to investment. The Marathon Club and The Conference Board both note that some 
existing regulation and accounting principles (such as the accounting standard FRS17 in the 
UK, and the requirement to expense investment in intangibles) unduly apply short-term 
pressure. As noted above, changes to regulation in some countries are already yielding 
positive results. 
The paper on causes identifies investor short-termism, driven by human behavioural factors, 
as a fundamental driver of market short-termism. Investors can make good money out of 
short-termism. Unless investors are incentivised to look beyond short-term profit 
maximisation, all other attempts to overcome short-termism may be ineffective. Regulation 
may be necessary to address the problems of market failure, specifically existence of 
externalities like climate change impacts, and over-exploitation of common resources. The 
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CFA Institute recommends consideration of regulated incentives for long-term investors, 
such as enhanced voting rights, higher dividends or lower capital gains tax. There are now 
widespread calls for pricing of externalities, particularly carbon pricing through a carbon tax 
or trading scheme. The Government could also play a role in encouraging long-term 
mandates, as advocated by the Marathon Club. From an investor perspective however, the 
long-term can be seen as a series of short-terms, so even lengthening of mandates may not 
be enough to shift the short-term focus. Ultimately, more direct measures, such as limits on 
trading [1] or re-evaluation of superannuation taxation [11], may need to be considered. 
Such measures could help to curb speculation, which has also been identified as 
contributing to short-termism in the market. 
One project focus group participant expressed the view that the finance sector alone will not 
be able to address short-termism in isolation from the rest of society. Specifically the sector 
needs to link in with governments, who have a key coordinating role to play in setting 
appropriate policy frameworks. The focus group discussed the need for internalisation of 
externalities and more signals and prices on various resources so that they can be disclosed 
and factored into decision-making. This could include disincentive measures, such as 
polluter’s taxes, and incentive regulation, such as differential capital gains tax. Regulation 
need not be heavy-handed. High-level dialogue between sectors is also needed to find ways 
to reward innovation at the same time as protecting the environment. 
The TUC has advocated a UK Government enquiry into the issue of short-termism and how 
it can be resolved. While this paper and the Action Plan that follows lay the foundations for 
addressing short-termism, and provide useful analysis of work already underway, to really 
get to the roots of the problem and to design innovative solutions, a finance sector-led in-
depth review with government participation will be necessary. Such a review should 
consider the role of regulation: whether current regulation acts as a disincentive to long-
termism and whether new regulation is necessary to incentivise long-term thinking and 
behaviour in the finance sector. 
2.3 Active ownership 
A long-term approach would require shareholders to act like owners, to hold shares for 
longer, trade less and exercise stewardship [4]. The UN Principles for Responsible 
Investment (UNPRI) encourage the concept of active ownership. The Principles provide a 
framework for investors to consider environmental, social and corporate governance issues 
(ESG), driven by the view that such issues can affect the performance of investment 
portfolios. Principle 2 specifically commits signatories to active ownership and 
incorporation of ESG into ownership policies and practices. Advocates of the Principles 
believe that shareholder engagement with businesses on issues of concern holds huge 
potential for impact and that investors are becoming more confident in influencing 
companies. 
In Australia, the BT Governance Advisory Service provides an investment risk management 
overlay service. Companies like VicSuper use this service to address portfolio exposure to 
corporate, social and environmental governance risks via research and dialogue with 
companies. VicSuper’s CEO Bob Welsh says of the service, “It engages with companies, 
identifies behaviour change we are seeking and reports back to us…We see this not as a 
passive share-holding, but active ownership” [12]. Despite innovations such as the BT 
service, there remains a need for greater shareholder activism in Australia, perhaps 
supported and encouraged by a strong NGO sector. 
The first project focus group discussed the idea that either the short-termist signal coming 
from analysts has to be fixed, or long-term asset owners need to be empowered to get their 
signals through to companies. The idea of a shareholder engagement clearing house was 
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suggested. This would be a mechanism for enabling asset owners to talk directly to 
company boards, to ‘trump’ the signals coming from analysts about what is important to 
investors. It was also suggested that fund managers should be forced to disclose how they 
vote on issues of corporate governance. 
The Conference Board report also suggests that institutional investors can be major 
advocates of long-term growth and sustainable corporate performance [2]. 
Specifically, institutional investors are in the position to seek a constructive dialogue with 
management and communicate their desire that the business be truly run in the long-term 
interest of shareholders  
    (Raj Thamotheram, Senior Adviser to Universities 
Superannuation Scheme (USS), quoted in [2]).  
In the US, changes in regulation are accredited with improving this dialogue by enabling 
greater use of shareholder proposals [2]. There are already Australian signatories to the 
UNPRI in all three categories of signatory – asset owners, investment managers and 
professional service partners. Many Australian organisations do not yet subscribe to the 
principles and should be encouraged to do so. Organisations such as the Australian Council 
of Super Investors (ACSI), a UNPRI signatory, can play a significant role in encouraging 
greater industry engagement with frameworks such as UNPRI. 
In the UK, the institutional investor Hermes (which is owned by the BT pension scheme, 
Britain’s largest pension scheme) is demonstrating active ownership. Hermes has set up 
“focus funds” aimed at helping under-performing companies to turn around their 
performance through working with management. Hermes articulates its ownership 
expectations to investee companies through the Hermes Principles – 10 principles designed 
to create “common understanding between businesses and their owners of the goals of a 
public company”[1]. Large US public pension funds are actively advocating sound corporate 
governance as a means to improve long-term value [2]. Funds such as Telstra Super 
(Australia’s largest corporate super fund) could take a similar leadership role and emulate 
the positive long-term stewardship demonstrated by UK and US pension funds. However, 
the cost-effectiveness of such a strategy needs to be considered. 
The focus group discussed the concept of the universal owner. This recognises that there can 
be a divergence of interest between an individual company and diversified investors with a 
stake in that company. If an investor has a highly diversified portfolio, as in the case of large 
institutional investors, then effectively they have a stake in the economy as a whole. 
Therefore, if an individual investee company creates externalities, they will affect the 
diversified investor’s portfolio in some way. This is a concept worth investigating and 
developing further as an aid to improving understanding of the impacts of externalities. 
2.4 Merger and Acquisition procedures 
Merger and acquisition (M&A) procedures have been identified as a possible contributor to 
short-termism. A report by the business think-tank, Tomorrow’s Company, in the UK 
recommends reforms to M&A procedures, specifically suggesting that executive directors 
obtain independent advice on proposals and that companies carry out independent reviews 
of acquisitions to assess their contribution to shareholder value (Restoring Trust: Investment 
in the 21st century, Tomorrow’s Company, June 2004, cited in [1]). The TUC report 
recommends employment of the ‘precautionary principle’ in relation to M&As, given their 
poor success rate in creating value [1]. 
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2.5 Accreditation 
The second project focus group raised the possibility of an accreditation scheme for 
organisations demonstrating a long-term focus. Such a scheme could be used to enhance 
branding and improve consumer awareness of the issues. It should be aspirational and 
rigorous, with reporting to support progress tracking and accountability. Factors to be 
measured could include human resources, stakeholder relations, governance and 
environmental management. It was noted that the International Organisation for 
Standardisation (ISO) is currently developing a standard on corporate social responsibility, 
although there is no scheme specifically for long-termism. 
2.6 Education 
The paper on causes identifies lack of adequate financial education, both of market 
participants, such as pension fund trustees, and at a societal level, as a significant factor 
contributing to short-termism. For improved communications to have the necessary impact, 
there is a need for better education of investors: 
…more financially educated individual investors who better understand the consequences of 
focusing on the short term to the detriment of the long term would help alleviate the short-
termism problem. A more knowledgeable investor would be better equipped to understand 
long-term business and investment strategy and could reinforce a focus on long-term 
horizons by corporate leaders, fund managers, and institutional investors. [4]. 
Corporate executives need to achieve a better understanding of how the market values their 
company. Companies, in turn, need to educate investors and analysts on the long-term 
value-creating drivers of their business and on the consequences of short-termism. Newly 
educated analysts need to be open-minded about alternative valuation methods, and for that 
to happen, change is needed at the level of analyst education [2]. The first project focus 
group discussed the value in taking a longer-term perspective to identify opportunities early 
on. Taking a longer and broader view of companies’ results in better outcomes. This is the 
message that analysts need to receive from investors who want to encourage a longer-term 
outlook. The CFA Institute report emphasises the need for better education of trustees of 
pension funds in particular and encourages pension fund to take up available education 
programs and materials.  
Media reporting of business performance can contribute to the short-termism paradigm. 
However, if well directed it can also improve communication flows. It is important 
therefore, that companies, analysts and investors provide information and analysis to the 
media that promote greater understanding and awareness of factors contributing to long-
term risk and value. 
Financial education can be implemented from school level upwards, with basic financial 
literacy programs in schools. Professional bodies can take a leadership role in sponsoring 
educational seminars and including relevant metrics, such as DCF, in curricula [4]. In 
Australia, organisations such as ASIC could be active in promoting financial education of 
the investment sector. Corporate sustainability case studies could be used as teaching cases 
in accountancy and finance courses. Educational changes are needed across the investment 
community. Already some universities and business schools are leading the way with 
introduction of corporate sustainability issues in curricula and sustainability-focused 
business courses, such as Green MBAs, that have a long-term focus. Research shows that if 
long-term sustainability considerations are integrated into existing programs, such as 
Accountancy majors, students see the issues as more relevant and important [13]. 
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2.7 Role of others  
The discussion paper on causes of short-termism identified that the finance sector does not 
operate in isolation from the rest of society. There are broad societal and human behavioural 
causes of short-termism that are particularly difficult for a single sector, organisation or 
individual to influence. There is therefore a need for consideration of the issue from many 
sectors of society, not only the finance sector. 
In the UK, for example, the TUC has taken a leadership role in addressing short-termism by 
commissioning its own review of the issue. The report noted that unions can play a role in 
dealing with short-termism by exercising their responsibilities as fund trustees, “Trade 
union members who are trustees can play a vital role in implementing any necessary 
reforms” [1]. It is in the interests of unions to be involved in addressing short-termism 
because it is union members who are vulnerable to an insufficiently long-term approach to 
management of their super funds. In the UK, most shares are owned by “collective 
investment vehicles representing the capital of millions of working people. The public are in 
large part the owners of British business. The very victims of corporate short-termism are 
the providers of the capital invested in those companies” [1]. A 2004 Australian Securities 
Exchange (ASX) study found that 55% of the Australian adult population, or approximately 
eight million people, owned shares directly or indirectly (via a managed fund or self-
managed superannuation fund) [14]. There is therefore a strong case for unions in Australia 
to take a similar leadership role in order to protect the long-term interests of its members. 
At a societal level, a shift in values could instigate change. As environmental pressures such 
as climate change and water shortages mount, we may begin to see a shift in societal beliefs 
and values towards a longer-term outlook. Use of conceptual frameworks such as TBL and 
Balanced Scorecard are representational of the interweaving of existing business practice 
with external expectations of business practices and are therefore arguably representative of 
changes already taking place in the external values of the world beyond business 
boundaries. This may increasingly impact business and the financial sector, via changing 
consumer demand and calls for regulation. To consciously accelerate a shift in values would 
require a great deal of effort, including strong support from the NGO sector. 
2.8 Leadership 
A theme emerging from the CFA Institute report is the need for strong leadership across all 
sections of the finance industry. Leadership is required to provide the necessary support for 
analysts, fund managers and corporate executives to develop a long-term approach. 
Effective governance of a company’s Board is a key method by which to inject long term 
horizons into top management’s consciousness [15], given its role in providing strategic 
direction for the organisation. As leaders have a strong influence on the actions of others, it 
is critical that leadership is supportive of measures to address short-termism. 
This paper provides examples of leadership across the industry such as encouragement of 
extra-financial analysis through the Enhanced Analytics Initiative discussed below, active 
ownership by institutional investors such as Hermes, development of new tools for 
performance measurement, companies seeking their own solutions through changed 
reporting regimes and even outstanding individual leadership as demonstrated by Warren 
Buffet. There are already leaders within Australia, such as the UNPRI signatories and 
companies that are calling for action on long-term extra-financial issues like climate change 
through initiatives such as the Australian Business Roundtable on Climate Change. 
However, this project challenges the Australian investment community to consider 
individual and collective leadership in actively seeking solutions short-termism. Initiatives 
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such as the Conference Board Summit series provide models that the Australian finance 
sector could adopt to begin to do so. 
The remainder of this paper discusses proposed solutions to address short-termism at the 
level of the individual links in the investment chain: 
 The investor link 
 The analyst link 
 The corporate link [2]. 
3 Solutions to short-termism at the level of links in the 
chain 
3.1 The investor link 
3.1.1 Individual and institutional investors 
As discussed above, the issue of how to incentivise investors away from a focus on short-
term profit maximisation is fundamental to overcoming short-termism in the finance sector. 
Some form of regulated incentives may be the only feasible solution. 
There are measures that investors can take however, to reduce short-term pressures in the 
investment chain. Long-term investors should formally incorporate commitment to long-
term performance into their policies and practices. Institutional investors have a role to play 
in the education of individual investors. Institutional investors need to communicate their 
long-term investment strategies to beneficiaries [4]. Super funds in Australia could, for 
example, issue long-term investment statements to beneficiaries to enhance understanding 
of how their funds are being managed for the long-term. 
Long-term mandates 
A commonly proposed solution to short-termism is that institutional investors such as 
pension (super) funds, award long-term mandates to ease the short-term pressures on fund 
managers. This is articulated by Will Hutton in The State To Come, p69, 1997, cited in [1]): 
Ownership is a serious business, and those charged with discharging the ownership 
responsibilities of the bulk of British business need themselves, to be given the architecture in 
which they can take a far-sighted view.  
There is surprising consensus on the issue of long-term mandates. For example, Tomorrow’s 
Company recommends that “Mandates should be established on the assumption that they 
are for the long term, ideally seven to ten years, with a regular review cycle” (Restoring 
Trust: Investment in the 21st century, Tomorrow’s Company, June 2004, cited in [1]). A report 
by the consulting firm Watson Wyatt suggests that “’Ten-year Mandates’ offer one possible 
solution” (Remapping our investment world, page 2, Watson Wyatt, October 2003, cited in [1]). 
Respondents to a 2005 survey into investment beliefs by the Marathon Club, thought that 
the most important way to improve corporate behaviour and performance is to lengthen the 
investment horizon [19]. Long-term mandates should give fund managers more freedom to 
make long-term decisions. However, long-term mandates would need to be issued in 
tandem with changes to remuneration and performance assessment [1]. 
In 2006, the Marathon Club issued a consultation paper setting out proposed characteristics 
of a long-term, long-only (LTLO) mandate. The Marathon Club defines LTLO investment as 
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…a fundamental, research oriented investment approach that incorporates the variables that 
explain business success and has a focused discipline of optimising positive absolute returns 
over the long-term business cycle [16]. 
The consultation paper identifies key features of an LTLO mandate including: aims, such as 
positive absolute returns over the long-term and capital preservation bias; investment 
strategies based around research emphasising business fundamentals and extra-financial 
factors, low portfolio turnover and promotion of long-term ownership; and fund managers 
with a strong commitment to continuous improvements in research processes and 
investment models [16]. A key component in implementing long-term mandates is the 
manager selection process. The Marathon Club believes that more time needs to be 
dedicated to selecting fund managers to fully investigate and understand their approach to 
investment. 
Responses to the Marathon Club’s consultation paper revealed the following key themes 
[17]: 
• Articulation of trustee investment beliefs is thought to be critical to the success of 
LTLO mandates and should be undertaken in conjunction with advisors and fund 
managers; 
• There needs to be a shift away from a focus on short-term performance (discussed 
further below); 
• Reform of governance structures and appropriate trustee understanding are also 
thought to be essential to a long-term view; and 
• Periodic review meetings should focus on the development of the portfolio’s 
investments and the underlying characteristics of the portfolio based on factors 
other than share price. 
Consensus was reached on the objectives of LTLO mandates as “efficient allocation and 
preservation of capital and risk protection.” [17] Responses further suggested that multi-
criteria performance evaluation is needed for LTLO mandates and a balanced scorecard 
approach may be appropriate. Detailed suggestions were made on the characteristics of 
LTLO mandates such as the suggestion that a LTLO mandate would allow cash holding 
until appropriate investment opportunities become available. Responses also suggest a need 
for trustees to delegate more authority to specialist advisors to assist with researching LTLO 
investment opportunities and monitoring performance [17]. 
The TUC report urges trustees to consider long-term mandates and also notes the potential 
for Government to encourage the implementation of LTLO mandates [1]. The Conference 
Board has called for a group of leading institutions committed to long-termism to design 
and disseminate a set of “best practice” principles for long-term investment [2]. Australian 
fund trustees should consider whether an LTLO approach is appropriate for their portfolio 
management and the Australian investment community could work collectively to establish 
guiding principles for long-term investment.  
The first project focus group discussed the need for the market to cater to different types of 
investors – short-term traders and long-term investors. The factors that are considered in 
investment decisions should be consistent with the investor’s investment pathway. 
Superannuation funds, with a lifetime timeframe, should be looking at long-term factors. A 
potentially controversial suggestion is the idea of limits on superfund competition to ease 
short-term performance pressure (arising from superfund customer choice). It was noted 
that rationalisation of super funds could also make it more difficult to incorporate ESG 
factors. 
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Education of young investors was also suggested as a strategy. There was some discussion 
about the need for education of superfund customers – to persuade beneficiaries that a 
short-term performance approach is not necessarily the best thing for their longer-term 
wealth creation. It was noted that such education faces the challenge of overcoming the 
overwhelming societal short-termist consumerism messages. 
The group discussed limits on disclosure of fund manager and superfund performance to 
ease short-term performance pressure. Five-year rolling average performance disclosure was 
suggested. 
3.1.2 Fund managers 
Assessment of fund manager performance is an important contributor to short-term 
behaviour in the finance sector. The Conference Board report cites evidence from a UN 
report showing that most jurisdictions do not support “a single-minded pursuit of profit 
maximisation by asset managers” (A Legal Framework for the Integration of Environmental, 
Social and Governance Issues into Institutional Investment, cited in [2]). Changes in how fund 
managers are assessed and managed by investors are seen as a key factor in moving towards 
a more long-term approach. 
Firstly, the time horizon for assessment of fund manager performance should be increased. 
A UK Treasury review of institutional investment, the Myners Review, put forward the 
following solution to the problem of short-term decision-making: 
…clarify the understanding between fund managers and their clients about time horizons 
and the length over which performance would be measured. Ultimately, clients should not 
terminate mandates before the end of the assessment period on performance grounds alone. 
(cited in [1]).  
The CFA Institute report suggests tying fund manager incentives to multi-year performance. 
A 2004 European Morningstar survey also suggested that fund manager bonuses should be 
linked to longer-term performance measures (cited in [18]). The first project focus group 
commented that super funds need to assess fund managers’ performance on a longer term 
basis. This signal would also impact on analysts. Al Gore and David Blood’s Generation 
Investment Management model was cited as an example. 
Secondly, incentives should aim to align the interests of the fund manager with the interests 
of shareholders and promote long-term investment strategies. Fund managers could be 
encouraged to commit a meaningful proportion of their own funds to the funds they 
manage, with a view to aligning client and manager interests [4]. Marathon Club 
consultation revealed that performance related fees are not thought to be positive for 
manager behaviour, and indeed could lead them to take more risks. A more popular 
solution is co-investment. This may be difficult in practice however, as the objectives of the 
fund manager may differ from the objectives of investors. Deferred bonuses are seen as 
good way of aligning investor and fund manager interests [17].  
Finally, to combat high fund manager turnover, which is costly and hampers performance 
evaluation, a KMPG report recommended that “large fund houses set up boutique-style 
departments in order to provide staff with the unconstrained and “free thinking” 
environment that attracts them to hedge funds”, such as the structure in place at AXA 
Investment Managers (cited in [18]). 
 
3.2 The analyst link 
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The short-termism chain can only be broken if securities analysts are also involved in the 
process [2]. In a market where investors are more interested in the long-term value-creating 
drivers of a business than its short-term performance, there is an opportunity for highly 
skilled analysts to differentiate themselves on the basis of high quality analysis and direct 
research. David Blood and Al Gore of Generation Investment Management have discussed 
the need for better analysis as follows: 
…analysts need to take account of factors that are not routinely monetised on balance sheets 
– including sustainability issues – as opposed to solely focusing on short-term returns. This 
means analyzing the implications for shareholder value of long-term economic, 
environmental and social challenges. They include future political or regulatory risks, the 
alignment of management and board with long-term company value, quality of human 
resources management, risks associated with governance structure, the environment, 
restructurings/mergers and acquisitions, branding, corporate ethics and stakeholder 
relations. (Financial Times FTFM, 2005, cited in [1]). 
Respondents to the 2005 Marathon Club survey expressed a strong preference for 
mainstreaming of good corporate governance and corporate responsibility practices into 
buy/sell decisions, rather than managing against a specialist index, or using a specialist 
team of analysts. The report suggests that issues such as training therefore need to be given 
further consideration [19]. Research is needed to identify a viable business model for 
analysts selling high-quality research with a long-term focus [2]. 
The CFA Institute describes the need to shift to a market in which “the hard work, expertise, 
and independent assessment of the best analysts are rewarded” [4]. To help create such a 
market, a major group of institutional investors has established the Enhanced Analytics 
Initiative (EAI). This initiative pools a percentage of broker commissions and directs it 
towards extra-financial research. On a 6-monthly basis, the EAI members award commission 
to those analysts deemed to have provided the highest quality analysis incorporating long-
term, extra-financial and intangible performance measures. The purpose of the fund is to 
incentivise more of this type of research and to encourage analysts to take a broader and 
longer-term view of companies [1]. Such initiatives need reinforcement to encourage 
analysts focused on long-term valuation and to create “a community of leaders” in the field 
[2]. Trustees in Australia could encourage long-term and extra-financial investment analysis 
by supporting the EAI or creating a similar Australian-centred scheme. 
Recent analyst initiatives are mainstreaming analysis of corporate governance issues. The 
Global Equity Unit at Deutsche Bank has developed a framework to analyze corporate 
governance issues and explore their relationship to stock market risk and corporate 
performance. The framework aims to integrate the metrics into investor portfolio 
management processes. Deutsche Bank’s research supports a link between corporate 
governance standards and equity risk [2].  
A plethora of rating systems is emerging, that claim to assess the performance of companies 
based on financial and extra-financial measures. These include indices such as the Dow 
Jones Sustainability Index, Business in the Community, the Corporate Responsibility Index 
and Reputex. While these ratings systems are not without problems and critics, they are 
arguably an important contribution to the wider recognition of the importance of extra-
financial analysis and disclosure. The Global Reporting Initiative (GRI), which provides a 
framework for reporting of extra-financial measures, is also making easier the work of 
analysts wishing to take a broader view of performance drivers. There is evidence that 
analysts who are provided with more comprehensive business information tend to issue 
more positive recommendations on the company’s securities [2]. Progressive Australian 
companies are already reporting against the GRI framework, although there is still 
resistance to such disclosure. 
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Despite evidence of the link between sustainability issues and long-term shareholder value, 
research indicates that such issues are peripheral for young financial analysts. There remain 
significant cultural barriers to change [2]. A 2005 study by United Nations Environment 
Programme Finance Initiative (UNEP FI) and the World Business Council for Sustainable 
Development was conducted “in the belief that financial analysis can be a significant enabler 
or inhibitor of change in corporate practice, and that young analysts may be key agents of 
change within financial institutions” (Reality Check. Young Financial Analysts’ Views on 
Environmental, Social and Corporate Governance Issues, United Nations Environment 
Programme Finance Initiative-World Business Council for Sustainable Development (Young 
Managers Team), Geneva, January 2005, cited in [2]). The study found that young analysts 
are largely disengaged from ESG issues. The findings underline the need to broaden the 
scope of analyst education. Attitudes to sustainability may well be determined more by 
world view than age, so it is likely that analysts already working in industry also need to be 
educated on these issues.  
3.3 The corporate link 
The first project focus group discussed the idea that it is not the finance sector itself that is of 
most importance in the discussion, but rather the finance sector’s impact upon the corporate 
sector. Therefore, the focus of outcomes should be on changing corporate behaviour and 
easing corporate short-term performance pressure. What matters are the signals that are 
received from the finance sector by corporate boards and CEOs about short-termism. 
In return for shareholders exercising their responsibilities as owners and adopting a long-
term investment approach, companies should seek out those investors who will form a long-
term shareholder base. As noted above, executives have a responsibility to educate investors 
about the value in long-term investment and to communicate the company’s long-term 
strategic objectives and benchmarks. Berkshire Hathaway is cited as an example of a 
company that has been successful in doing so and has profited from retaining a core 
shareholder base that has supported it in implementing long-term value-creation strategies 
(it should be noted however that Berkshire Hathaway’s success is unusual and largely 
attributable to outstanding leadership). 
Although many companies are now reporting on extra-financial performance, very few 
companies have clearly articulated their long-term vision and strategy for sustainable 
performance and value building. Without a long-term vision and strategy, it is difficult for 
executives and directors to make long-term investment decisions. A sound long-term 
strategy conversely can “act as a beacon to senior executives and board directors, permitting 
them to weather either natural economic downturns or temporary negative externalities” 
[2]. Like any other facet of business life, investment can be influenced by current fads, for 
example, the recent investment by Australian banks in Chinese financial institutions. 
However, despite potential short-term negative effects of resisting these fads, by following 
an explicit set of values and communicating effectively with its stakeholders, an 
organisation can ride through these short-term effects in the interests of the longer-term 
strategy [20]. Companies that have successfully communicated their long-term strategies to 
investors could be identified as a means of inspiring other investors [2]. 
The Conference Board recommends widespread adoption of an enterprise risk management 
framework as a means of bringing clarity to and communicating long-term strategy [2]. 
Developments in the field of risk management mean there are numerous sophisticated tools 
available to assess risk. As noted, initiatives like the Carbon Disclosure Project are helping to 
identify and communicate extra-financial risk such as exposure to carbon risk. In 2006 ASIC 
issued guidelines on the preparation of better prospectuses, including improved risk 
disclosure incorporating sensitivity analysis. Improved risk management techniques 
increase opportunities for long-term investment by reducing future uncertainties.  
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Remuneration and performance assessment 
Executive remuneration is seen as a primary area for change. As with fund manager 
remuneration, there is a need for executive remuneration to be linked to long-term 
shareholder value. There has been much discussion of the effect on behaviour of 
remuneration through options and how this can promote short-term behaviour when 
compared to other remuneration options. 
Instead of options, manager compensation could be linked in a meaningful way to 
shareholder value to align long-term corporate goals and strategies with long-term 
shareholder interests [4]. The Tomorrow’s Company report recommends a greater level of 
remuneration in shares (Restoring Trust: Investment in the 21st century, Tomorrow’s 
Company, June 2004, cited in [1]). Plender, a UK Financial Times columnist, favours straight 
equity over options with executives locked into it for longer periods. Plender’s preferred 
solution, however, is a return to a greater emphasis on basic pay with equity awards used 
only to reward outstanding performance (Going off the rails: Global Capital and the Crisis of 
Legitimacy, Plender, p263, cited in [1]). Alfred Rappaport, on the other hand, argues that a 
move away from share-based remuneration could make directors risk averse and instead 
recommends that options are structured to reward long-term performance (The Economics of 
Short-Term Performance Obsession, Rappaport, pages 72-74, Financial Analysts Journal, 1 May 
2005, cited in [1]). The Shareholder Association has encouraged a move to options-based 
reward systems that reward performance over the long-term.  
The focus group discussed corporate executive remuneration. It was suggested that deferred 
remuneration and bonuses would encourage a longer-term perspective. The maximum 
deferral period was thought to be around 5-7 years. Longer than this, could lead to perverse 
outcomes such as nationwide talent loss. Macquarie Bank was cited as an example of a 
company with successful deferred remuneration programs. The Macquarie model provides 
long-term rewards over periods of up to 10 years. The group also noted the need for greater 
disclosure of corporate remuneration structures. 
Research by Henderson Global Investors found that rewards for directors’ performance in 
relation to extra-financial issues were also linked to short-term incentives, although these 
issues are by their nature, long-term [1]. In the UK, the USS has signalled its intention to 
include extra-financial measures of performance in their discussions with investee 
companies on their remuneration arrangements [2]. As remuneration is an important 
behavioural incentive, structures should be reviewed to ensure they encourage desirable 
outcomes for investors and companies [1]. 
Investors and fund managers could play a role in encouraging the companies in which they 
invest to develop processes to ensure that companies award executive compensation on a 
long-term basis. What is required is a holistic approach to compensation, going beyond a 
focus on CEOs and including other industry players including analysts and fund managers 
[4]. 
4 Indicators of change 
There are positive signs of change. Initiatives such as the EAI and the work of the Marathon 
Club demonstrate that there is acknowledgement of the issue of short-termism and the first 
steps are being taken to address the underlying causes. Graeme Davies, Chairman of the 
Marathon Club sums up the incentive for change thus: “Improving the long-term financial 
and qualitative buying power of fund beneficiaries should be our primary goal. It is not 
enough to secure an individual’s pension and then fail to consider our collective impact on 
the factors affecting the quality of that pensioner’s retirement.”[16]. 
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The Conference Board report identifies the drivers for change as [2]: 
• the need to restore investor confidence in the wake of corporate scandals; 
• the active engagement of institutional investors with the companies in which they 
invest, including advocating accountability, enforcement of shareholders rights and 
adoption of higher standards of business integrity. And the investigation by 
institutional investors of longer-term investment opportunities; 
• active encouragement of companies by investors to review compensation structures 
and performance metrics and devise schemes based on financial and extra-financial 
indicators; 
• international convergence on accounting principles, particularly focused on true 
value drivers and reporting of extra-financial performance measures; 
• research linking sustainability and improved stock prices and shareholder value, the 
most notable of which is the UNEP FI Materiality Project report of June 2004. Data in 
the report shows that “long-term protection of shareholder value rests upon the 
rigorous integration in the corporate strategy of policies on climate change, internal 
governance and openness to shareholder proposals, innovation and scientific 
research, labor rights and public health” [2]. This is a highly complex area and 
quantification of value remains challenging [21]. There is a need for more meta-
analysis of research studies in this area [13]; and 
• efforts by regulators, intermediaries and institutional investors to focus research on 
long-term value, through projects such as the Enhanced Analytics Initiative. 
5 Conclusion 
Overcoming the structural, behavioural and cultural barriers to long-termism in the finance 
sector will not be easy. Encouragingly though, there is recognition of the positive drivers for 
change and a growing consensus on the need for change. Change is needed across the 
investment chain and all parties in the chain must be involved – investors, analysts and 
investee companies. An effective national response will require action from corporate 
Australia, sections of the media, and fund managers [11]. The Government must also be 
involved. Numerous positive examples exist of progressive individuals and organisations 
within the investment community internationally who are taking the lead on initiatives to 
address short-termism. Nevertheless, much more needs to be done, and the problem of how 
to shift investors away from a focus on short-term profit maximisation remains. The 
Australian investment community as a whole must begin to engage more fully in the effort 
to address short-termism. 
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